viernes, octubre 05, 2012
@OLPL on confirms detention of Yoani Sanchez
jueves, octubre 04, 2012
Venezuela, Oct. 7: The possible, the probable, and the preferable
HAVANA TIMES — It's been 14 years since Hugo Chavez burst into the Venezuelan presidency, and with him his project known as the "Bolivarian Revolution."
Weariness with the corruption of the Fourth Republic and the exclusion of the poor (who were suffering the impact of neoliberal policies) led to the establishment of an electoral front that put forward the lieutenant colonel, who won by a large margin over the other candidates, especially the representatives of the traditional parties.
From that moment on, the new government faced stiff resistance from those parties, as well as from an alliance of the media and the urban middle and upper classes, which in 2002 and 2003 turned to strategies of destabilization, including a failed coup. The new government managed to weather the storm, reconstructing a framework of domestic and international legitimacy in successive elections from 2004 to 2006.
The process, in an attempt to overcome the deficits of the Fourth Republic, expanded citizens' participation in Venezuela and put the social agenda in the center of the debate. Public policies grew, generating processes for including the marginalized – thanks to revenues generated by oil.
These elements — certainly positive — joined the redefinition of the regulatory framework (with a new constitution and the passage of new laws) with the recuperation of the role of the state as an active agent in national life, as it delineated the main features of the project that was (self) identified as Bolivarian.
But the democratizing effect of the new government was gradually tinged, starting in 2006, by increasing personal ambitions and political bureaucratization with the emergence of a hyper-presidential regime, a dominant political organization (the United Socialist Party of Venezuela, or PSUV), and the development of participatory mechanisms (community councils) that operated as instruments of political control and mobilization.
The rise of Hugo Chavez's charismatic leadership was accompanied by the discretionary use of state resources, as well as by the usurpation of the other national powers, both in party politics and social forces (movements, organizations) and the media, including those identified with the bourgeoisie as well as by popular figures and the independent left.
With the spreading of the idea of "Socialism of the 21st Century," the promotion of new enabling legislation, the proposal for constitutional reform and the creation of the PSUV, these steps advanced the authoritarian and statist tendencies, which were particularly visible in government institutions, the economic model and the legal architecture of the nation.
The concentration of power, which converges in the figure of President Hugo Chavez, appeals to a leader-masses relationship and confrontation with the enemy (opponents) in a strategy that tends to increasingly ignore current political norms — including the constitution itself — and which involves the manipulation of justice, control and surveillance of the press, and setbacks with respect to the human rights situation.
Likewise, within the Bolivarian ranks themselves, restrictions have been placed on the options for dissent and participation in the construction of the process; instead, there are constant appeals to the commander-president, to a military lexicon (using words like "battle," "campaign" and "missions"), and reliance on command and control styles implemented within the vertical structure of Chavez that leave no room for such "bourgeois folly."
Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez. Foto: Cubadebate.cu, March 2012.
With such a backdrop, Venezuela finds itself heading for the upcoming October 7 elections, one of the most significant moments of contemporary political history. On one side, this will reveal all of the strengthening and wearing down of a government anchored in power for 14 years, one whose success depends largely on the charismatic leadership of Hugo Chavez and the scope of his successful (yet deteriorated) social policies.
In the opposite corner, a motley opposition seems to have overcome its errors and divisions and has projected the youthful figure of Henrique Capriles, speaking in less belligerent language than his opponent but sharing the rosary of promises, magical-religious allusions and a not always well outlined program.
Both options seem not to have convinced an important segment of the electorate (the "neither-nors"), those who vacillate between recognition of the positive social management of the Chavez government and opposition to his authoritarian manner; they swing between hope for change and distrust of the old elites who surround the opposition candidate.
The underlying drama, however, is that the large blocs competing in the current electoral conjuncture — the Chavistas vs. the anti-Chavistas — are appealing to similar organizational and identifying elements: parties with diffuse ideologies, charismatic leadership, the use of rhetoric; and populist, patronage-fueled mobilizing programs and styles.
A depolarizing option (combining the defense of rights and freedoms with a sincere and substantive concern for social justice) has been obstructed by the polarized atmosphere as well as the institutional design (see the "Organic Law on Electoral Process") that favors and perpetuates it.
Experiences like the "Partido Patria para Todos" party, in 2010, and the bloc of popular organizations that proposed labor leader Orlando Chirino as an independent candidate — against the officialist ruling party and the opposition — don't seem to have many options in the current scenario, even when their presence is hopeful for those of us who identify with a socialist and democratic option as a solution to the crisis in Venezuela.
Once again, the relationship between the possible, the probable and the preferable is straining the panorama of political analyses and options. This explains why in the upcoming presidential election, the gaze of more than a few democrats and social activists is focused on preventing the victory of Chavez, whose victory — if we consider the sustained and belligerent references of his performance and speech — threatens to radically capture and transform the political arena, negating the possibility of representing political plurality and a correlation of forces and eliminating the autonomous action of citizens.
This is an interpretation accompanied by the realization that even if Capriles wins, he would have to incorporate those popularly recognized policies of the current government — social missions and community participation — and govern with a style and program of national (re)conciliation, in light of the enormous heterogeneity of the alliance around his candidacy and in the face of Chavez's political strength, which would be converted into (unless an electoral defeat or the death of their leader plays out adversely) a formidable and united opposition.
Unlike in other nations of the hemisphere, what's at stake in Venezuela isn't a simple rotation within the ruling elite or some moderate shift in the continuity of a political and economic project of integration into the system of globalization.
The central dilemma of every Venezuelan is whether they will again cast their vote (and their trust) in a government that threatens to radically and irreversibly alter the political field with the advancement of its authoritarian tendencies, or whether they will choose an alternative — with its inconsistencies and weaknesses — that objectively would have to negotiate with its opponents and the rest of society to lay better foundations for the exercise of citizens' rights and autonomy and political pluralism.
Because of that, many people won't vote so much for Capriles and his electoral alliance/program as they will against Chavez and his visible hegemonic project. Whatever the result of the October 7th elections (the change of a regime or the deepening of an authoritarian course), the fact is that a new stage begins in Venezuela of increasing complexity and political risks.
Tonight in Miami, USA: U.S. Cuba Policy and the Cuban-American
miércoles, octubre 03, 2012
La Gran Familia: TONIGHT Corina Matamoros on Raúl Martínez
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Please Join Us
for a special presentation by author and curator
Corina Matamoros Tuma
Contemporary Cuban Art Curator
National Museum of Fine Arts, Havana, Cuba
in celebration of the seminal monograph
Raul Martinez: La gran familia
Wednesday, October 3rd 6-8 pm
Lecture 6:30 Reception to follow
Books for sale at special reduced price $40
All payments accepted, administered by the Bronx Museum
RSVP info@the8thfloor.org
The 8th Floor
17 West 17th St
New York City
www.the8thfloor.org
Co-hosted by The Shelley & Donald Rubin Foundation and the Bronx Museum of the Arts
lunes, septiembre 17, 2012
Cuba, Miami y la homofobia
Hoy leí en PD un resumen del panel sobre LGBT del sábado pasado en el NYPL de Harlem (vea mi foto de los ponentes arriba). Acerca de lo que Alexis Romay escribe allí sobre mi pregunta acerca de la homofobia en Miami hacia el final del evento, le digo: o me entendió mal o no me quisó entender. A eso regreso mas abajo.
Me alegro mucho de que alguien con su talento y sentido de matices y complejidades se haya tomado el tiempo de compartir con un público mas amplio lo que allí se discutió. A mi juicio, su resumen del evento está muy bien hecho y es bastante acertado - especialmente lo que escribe sobre cuan buena, honesta y llena de experiencias y hechos reales estuvo la intervención de la escritora Achy Obejas. Ella combinó una reflexión personal con citas muy específicas de leyes abusivas y violaciones claras de los derechos de la comunidad LGBT en Cuba por parte del gobierno.
También, las criticas abiertas de Achy a los métodos cínicos y paternalistas de Mariela Castro (a quien denominó "the fag-hag-in-chief") fueron contundentes e importantes. Al mismo tiempo, ella misma reconoció que Mariela - desde una posición de poder y privilegio - ha dado pasos positivos a favor de que haya mas tolerancia hacia la comunidad LGBT - especialmente para tratar de concienciar un poco a los hetero-retrógrados dentro de los círculos mas altos de poder en Cuba.
Hacía falta hacer un buen resumen del evento - porque fue poderoso y trató de un asunto importante. Además, sabemos que es un asunto que ha sido manipulado por el gobierno cubano y por intereses políticos.
Como bien dice Alexis, fue una pena que tantas de las personas presentes en la intervención de Mariela Castro de hace tres meses en el NYPL no se tomaran el tiempo de escuchar a las otras muchas voces que estuvieron presentes el sábado - tanto cubanos activistas desde la isla y escritores del exilio, como académicos como Jafari Allen, que ha dedicado bastante de su carrera a este tema.
Me hubiera gustado mucho presenciar un debate abierto y respetuoso entre personas que abogan por los derechos de la comunidad LGBT, pero desde posicionamientos políticos distintos. Achy y Mariela; Yoani y La Negra Cubana Tenía que Ser; Paquito "el de Cuba" y Paquito “el d'Rivera”; Orlando Luis Pardo Lazo y Yasmín Portales Machado; Julio Cesar González Pages y hasta el mismísimo Miguel Barnet.
Pero ésto no pudo ser - ni en LASA, ni en la NYPL de la 42, ni en la de la 135. Parece que en el segundo caso Mariela no quería un debate de verdad sino solo un auditorio, y que ir hasta la calle 135 en un sábado tan bello era pedir demasiado a aquellos que quieren creer en una sola realidad luminosa "dentro" de la revolución.
No escuché a Mariela en Nueva York, pero sí la pude oir en LASA. La encontré bastante profesional, inteligente y conocedora a fondo de su tema. Pero al mismo tiempo había una gran laguna en su ponencia sobre la falta total de derechos de asociación independiente en Cuba para grupos LGBT. Es mas - y como bien dice Alexis - o estás con CENESEX, o no existes. Los activistas LGBT independientes son tratados como opositores y disidentes por definición, por el mero hecho de insistir en preservar su independencia.
Acerca de lo que escribió Alexis sobre Allen y sobre mi, solo le puedo decir - como digo arriba - , o nos entendió mal o no nos quiso entender. Allen es un experto en temas LGBT y acaba de publicar un libro titulado ¡Venceremos? (fíjense bien en el signo de interrogación) basado en sus investigaciones dentro de la isla. No lo he leído todavia, pero este resumen del contenido deja claro que nadie engañó a Allen durante su estancia en la isla:
"Promoting the revolutionary socialist project of equality and dignity for all, the slogan ¡Venceremos! (We shall overcome!) appears throughout Cuba, everywhere from newspapers to school murals to nightclubs. Yet the accomplishments of the Cuban state are belied by the marginalization of blacks, the prejudice against sexual minorities, and gender inequities."Es verdad que hacia el final del evento hice una pregunta a los ponentes pidiéndoles que compararan – según sus experiencias personales y estudios sobre el tema - la homofobia en Cuba con la de Miami. En mi pregunta nunca mencioné ni al gobierno cubano ni al norteamericano. Mi pregunta tenía la intención - después de oír bastante sobre los abusos gubermentales mas que condenables contra los gays en Cuba - de pedir a los ponentes que hablaran un poco sobre la homofobia por parte del pueblo cubano tanto dentro como fuera de la isla.
La homofobia tiene dos caras en todas las sociedades: la que se expresa a traves de las políticas gubernamentales y los derechos sociales según la legislación (o la falta de ellos); y la que se encuentra dentro de una cultura y de los corazones y las mentes de las personas.
Que culpa tengo yo - como canta Albita - que algunas de las personas presentes - como Alexis y la señora indignada que menciona - no me dieran el beneficio de la duda, y concluyeran que yo quería igualar discriminaciones sancionadas por un estado con los prejuicios que todos llevamos adentro?
Le doy gracias los ponentes por responder a mi pregunta honesta con respuestas tan serias y complejas como detalladas e íntimas. ¡Que siga el debate!
